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Abstract in English 
Why are regional unemployment differentials in Europe so persistent if, as the wage curve 
literature demonstrates, there is no compensation in labour markets? We hypothesise that 
workers in high-unemployment regions are compensated in housing markets. Modelling 
regional unemployment differentials as a consequence of centralised wage bargaining, we show 
that clearing of land markets may undo the incentive for workers to migrate to low-
unemployment regions in general equilibrium. The compensating differentials hypothesis is 
tested on city-level data for several countries. Controlling for variation in income and amenities, 
housing is found to be about 3 percent less expensive on average in cities where unemployment 
is 10 percent up. An analysis of housing demand survey data, which takes account of housing 
heterogeneity, yields a similar negative relationship. The magnitude of the income effect 
generated by this compensating differential is consistent with a − 0.10 wage curve elasticity. 
Workers in regions with high unemployment and low per capita income are therefore not 
necessarily worse off, and regional support programs should take this into account.  
Keywords: regional unemployment, housing markets, wage curve, compensating differentials, 
hedonic models, regional policy 
 
JEL code: R23, R13, J64 
Abstract in Dutch 
Waarom zijn regionale werkloosheidsverschillen in Europa zo persistent als er, zoals de wage 
curve literatuur laat zien, geen compensatie is op de arbeidsmarkt? Wij betogen dat werkenden 
in regio’s waar de werkloosheid hoog is gecompenseerd worden in woningmarkten. In een 
model, waarin regionale werkloosheidsverschillen het gevolg zijn van centrale 
loononderhandelingen, laten we zien dat, door het ruimen van grondmarkten, de prikkel om te 
verhuizen naar regio’s waar de werkloosheid laag is verdwijnt in algemeen evenwicht. De 
hypothese van compensatie in woningmarkten testen we op gegevens voor steden in 
verschillende Europese landen. Wanneer we controleren voor variatie in inkomens en 
amenities, dan zijn woningen gemiddeld ongeveer 3 procent goedkoper in steden waar de 
werkloosheid 10 procent hoger is. In een analyse van het Nederlandse Woning Behoefte 
Onderzoek, waarin gecontroleerd wordt voor heterogeniteit van de woningvoorraad, vinden we 
een vergelijkbaar verband. Het inkomenseffect van compensatie is consistent met een wage 
curve elasticiteit van − 0.10. Werkenden in regio’s, waar de werkloosheid hoog is en het per 
capita inkomen laag, hoeven dus niet noodzakelijkerwijs slechter af te zijn, en programma’s 
voor regionale steun zouden hier rekening mee moeten houden.  
Steekwoorden: regionale werkloosheid, woningmarkten, wage curve, compensatie, hedonische 
prijzen, regionaal beleid     Contents 
Summary  i 
1  Introduction 1 
2  An equilibrium relationship between unemployment and house prices  4 
3  Compensation and regional adjustment  8 
4  Empirical analysis  9 
4.1  European Urban Audit data  10 
4.2  Evidence from a housing demand survey  12 
5  Conclusions and policy implications  15 
References  17 
 
 | i 
Summary 
It is a long-held belief that workers in high-unemployment regions earn higher wages. 
However, recent empirical work suggests that wages correlate negatively to unemployment, 
with an elasticity of − 0.10. If regional unemployment differentials are an equilibrium outcome, 
and the persistence of these differentials in Europe suggest that they are, then compensation has 
to come from other sources. In this paper we investigate the hypothesis that regional 
unemployment is compensated in housing markets.  
 
Our economic intuition is formalised in a concise core-periphery model, in which wages are 
bargained at the national level. Because of fixed capital, labour productivity varies over regions 
and unemployment differentials result. Workers are mobile in our model, so differences in 
expected utility are absent in equilibrium. As the low-unemployment core attracts more 
workers, land is more expensive here, and workers in the high-unemployment periphery are 
therefore compensated.  
 
The hypothesis is tested on city-level data, using the European Urban Audit. A negative 
relationship between unemployment and average house prices is found in each of the 9 
countries in our sample. Controlling for income and amenity differentials, houses are about 3 
percent less expensive in regions where unemployment is 10 percent up. We verify these 
findings using a Dutch housing demand survey, which allows us to control for heterogeneity of 
the housing stock. As a similar relationship is found, it seems that omission of such controls in 
our analysis of the Urban Audit data does not critically affect the results.  
 
The extent of compensation is consistent with a wage curve elasticity of − 0.10. So workers in 
high-unemployment regions earn lower wages, but this effect seems to be counterbalanced by 
the income effect of lower house prices. Our analysis does not indicate how compensation is 
distributed between different groups of the population within regions.  
 
Our evidence suggests that workers in regions with high unemployment and low per capita 
income are not necessarily worse off. Regional support programs such as the European 
Structural Funds may want to take this into account. Also, compensation in housing markets 
may call for adjustment of unemployment benefit levels to regional price levels. Finally, 
rigidities in housing supply, potentially related to restrictive policies, may induce compensating 
differentials that prolong regional unemployment differentials out of equilibrium.   
 | 1 
1 Introduction
1 
The puzzle that inspired our research is the coexistence of a wage curve and persistent regional 
unemployment differentials. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) present evidence of a wage curve 
for a variety of countries and time periods, consistently finding wages to be 1 percent lower in 
regions where unemployment is 10 percent up (cf. Groot et al., 1992, Card, 1995, Baltagi and 
Blien, 1998). Their analysis contradicts a long-held belief that wages compensate for regional 
unemployment differentials, which originates from Harris and Todaro (1970) and Hall (1970, 
1972). If workers in high-unemployment regions earn lower wages, one would expect regional 
differences in unemployment to disappear through labour migration in a relatively short period 
of time. However, it is well established that regional unemployment differentials may be large 
and very persistent, predominantly in European countries (cf. OECD, 2000, 2005, Overman and 
Puga, 2002). 
 
Persistence of regional unemployment differentials is usually explained with barriers to 
interregional migration, possibly related to housing market institutions (cf. OECD, 2005).
2 
However, if regional unemployment differentials persist for a longer period, say 10 to 20 years, 
costly adjustment alone does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation.
3 An alternative view is 
that these regional differences in unemployment reflect an equilibrium outcome. Workers 
should then enjoy the same utility in each region, being compensated in other markets for high 
regional unemployment rates. This second line of reasoning, the existence of compensating 
differentials, will be pursued in the present paper.  
 
Although compensating differentials may operate through any consumption good a priori, the 
two most obvious channels are amenities and housing markets. For the United States, empirical 
evidence seems to support the hypothesis that workers accept less favourable labour market 
conditions if a region offers consumer amenities such as an agreeable climate (cf. Roback, 
1982, Marston, 1985, Blomquist et al., 1988, Gyourko and Tracy, 1989, 1991).
4 One may 
wonder however, what amenity could explain the large regional differences in unemployment, 
observed in for example Germany or the United Kingdom, which seem relatively homogeneous 
in terms of climate and natural scenery. More fundamentally, as pointed out by Roback (1982), 
consumer amenities are capitalised in labour markets only to the extent that producers compete 
 
1 The authors would like to thank Pieter Gautier, Pierre Koning, Alan Manning and Piet Rietveld, who commented on early 
drafts of this paper, as well as participants of the EALE / SOLE World Conference 2005 in San Francisco. Discussions with 
colleagues at CPB and Free University Amsterdam were also most helpful.  
2 The relationship between housing market institutions and migration has been investigated amongst others by Minford et al. 
(1987) and Hughes and McCormick (1987), who point to the lack of private sector rental units as a major factor. A related 
issue that has received considerable attention in the literature is the Oswald hypothesis, which states that owner occupancy 
raises aggregate unemployment because it hampers labour mobility (Oswald, 1999).  
3 For one reason, trade and mobility of capital may be expected to equilibrate regional labour market disparities over such a 
long period, even if labour is completely immobile.  
4 Most of these papers consider compensation for wage differentials, rather than unemployment.  2 | 
with consumers for land. Otherwise, they are capitalised in land markets.
5 Therefore, it seems 
implausible that regional unemployment differentials within European countries are fully 
compensated by amenities. Carlsen (2000) is the only study we are aware of that tests the 
amenity model on European data (for Norway), and he rejects it. The alternative hypothesis that 
workers are compensated in land (housing) markets has received less attention in the literature 
so far.
6 This is all the more surprising, because in many countries, the observation that houses 
are less expensive in high-unemployment regions seems almost evident.  
 
Although we believe that compensation in housing markets may occur in several institutional 
settings, we will present here a stylised core-periphery model with centralised wage bargaining. 
In many continental European countries, centralised wage bargaining covers more than 80 
percent of employees (OECD, 2004), so it seems a natural starting point for explaining regional 
unemployment.
7 In our model, this labour market distortion hampers adjustment of wages to 
lower labour productivity levels in the periphery, which results in unemployment. We 
demonstrate that in general equilibrium, workers in the periphery are compensated by lower 
house prices. 
 
Compensation in housing markets may be relevant not only in equilibrium, but also in the 
adjustment process towards equilibrium. Durability and inelastic supply of housing, possibly 
related to growth controls or other spatial policies, imply a strong relationship between prices 
and labour market shocks (cf. Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005, Glaeser et al., 2005). For example, 
 
5 By capitalisation of regional amenities in land (labour) markets, we mean that regional rents (wages) assume values such 
that inhabitants are equally well of everywhere. So if proximity to the beach is capitalised in land (labour) markets, rents 
(wages) must be higher here than in a region far from the beach that is equal in all other aspects.  
6 Compensation in housing markets has received some attention in the urban economics literature. For example, Zenou and 
Smith (1995) and Brueckner and Zenou (1999) present urban efficiency wage models, in which there is a trade off between 
local unemployment and house prices. Smith and Zenou (2003) present a model with compensation in housing markets 
where the labour market imperfection is mismatch rather than costly monitoring. At the level of regions, the existence of 
compensating differentials is indicated indirectly by the limited sensitivity of aggregate migration to regional wage and 
unemployment differentials, found in numerous studies (cf. OECD, 2000, 2005). Analyses that include regional house prices 
tend to find that they affect migration patterns significantly (cf. Jackman and Savouri, 1992, Cameron and Muellbauer, 
1998). These results are consistent with the view that lower house prices compensate workers for less favourable regional 
labour market perspectives. Finally, we refer to two papers that evaluate the impact of regional house prices on earnings 
and unemployment in the UK (Blackaby and Manning, 1992, and Cameron and Muellbauer, 2001). These studies find 
upward effects of house prices on earnings, which is consistent with compensation of wages in housing markets. Cameron 
and Muellbauer (2001) also find an upward effect of house prices on unemployment, which they interpret as an (exogenous) 
cost-of-location effect. Modelling earnings and unemployment, these studies do not provide direct evidence of compensation 
in housing markets. 
7 However, there have been hardly any attempts to analyse these consequences in a formal economic model. An exception 
is Faini (1999), who relates unionisation of unskilled workers to depressed growth in backward regions. The author provides 
two interesting cases that highlight the impact of centralised wage bargaining. He relates the surge in unemployment in East 
Germany in the period 1990 −  1992 to a decrease in wage inequality and he notes that unemployment in the Italian 
Mezzogiorno region rose rapidly after the 1968 push for wage equalisation. Overman and Puga (2002) also provide a 
stylised model with regional wage rigidities.  | 3 
as migrants move away from regions experiencing adverse demand shocks, house prices may 
increase in low unemployment regions (inelastic short-run supply) and decrease in high 
unemployment regions (durability). The resulting compensating differential may be larger than 
capitalisation in land markets can account for.  
 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper is based on two types of data. Information on 
labour and housing market conditions at the city level is derived from the Urban Audit 
(European Commission, 2004). Negative bivariate relationships between average house prices 
per square meter and unemployment rates are established for all 9 European countries in our 
sample. Elasticities in a range from − 0.4 to − 0.6 cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level of 
significance for any country. Controlling for income and amenity differentials, an elasticity to 
unemployment of about − 0.3 is found.  
 
Estimates based on the city-level data may overstate the compensating differential, if 
households in low-unemployment cities occupy houses that are of a higher quality, or 
understate it, if these houses are smaller on average.
8 These objections are examined in an 
analysis that employs housing demand survey data for the Netherlands. We obtain regional land 
rent differentials by regressing house prices on characteristics and region dummies. For both 
house prices and land rents, a negative elasticity is found in the same order of magnitude as 
indicated by the European data.  
 
We embed the compensating differentials hypothesis in a theoretical framework in the next two 
sections. The general equilibrium model with centralised wage bargaining will be presented in 
Section 2, whereas the role of housing markets in regional adjustment processes is the subject of 
section 3. Section 4 contains our empirical analyses, both of city-level and micro data. In 
concluding the paper, Section 5 interprets the magnitude of the compensating differential 
implied. Furthermore, we discuss a number of policy implications here.  
 
8 The housing markets literature stresses that (extreme) heterogeneity is a fundamental property of housing as a 
consumption good (Smith et al., 1988).  4 | 
2  An equilibrium relationship between unemployment and 
house prices 
In a long-run equilibrium, land prices are likely to be the main determinant of regional house 
price differentials. Hence, we model regional land markets rather than housing markets in this 
section. The essential property of land that generates compensating differentials is that it is 
neither tradable nor producible. Intuitively, land prices are higher in regions with attractive 
labour market conditions, because more workers want to live there, and supply is fixed.
9 We 
formalise this intuition in a general equilibrium model in which the labour market is 
characterised by centralised wage bargaining.
10 Wage setting in this model is dominated by the 
economic conditions in the core region, in which labour is more productive than in the 
periphery. Unemployment in peripheral regions results because wages, set at the national level, 
exceed the marginal productivity of labour. In equilibrium, clearing of land markets undoes the 
incentive for workers to move to the core.  
Regional land markets 
The regional supply of land is assumed to be fixed in our model. Hence, a market clearing rent 
can be derived by solving the consumer problem, under the additional assumption that firms do 
not use land as a production factor. Suppose that all workers are homogeneous, consuming land 
S and a composite good X. Given a Cobb-Douglas functional form, the utility equals 
β β − = 1 ) , ( i i i i X S S X U , where subscript i denotes the region. Dependent on the workers’ 
employment status, her income Ii equals the regional wage wi or unemployment benefits b (with 
b < wi).
11 It is assumed that the composite good is traded on world markets, and its price is 
normalised to unity. The land rent ri faced by a worker is specific to the region of residence. 
Solving the utility maximisation problem, the worker consumes (1 – β)Ii units of X and βIi/ri 
units of land.  
 
For simplicity, we assume that each region has the same endowment of land, which is 
normalised to unity. Let Pi denote the regional population. Furthermore, ui is the (endogenous) 
regional unemployment rate. Clearing of land markets implies the following equilibrium rent: 
() [] i i i i i w u b u P r − + = 1 β  (2.1) 
 
9 A positive relationship between the size of the regional workforce and land prices may work through a more subtle channel 
than fixed supply of land. Suppose that in each region, workers live in a city and provide labour in the local Central Business 
District. It is well established in the urban economics literature that the costs of living in a city increase with city size, either 
through commuting costs or land prices (cf. Fujita, 1989). Therefore, as more workers move to the core city to earn higher 
wages, the costs of living increase. In equilibrium, wage differentials are fully compensated by the sum of house prices and 
commuting costs in such a model. 
10 Alternatively, we could have chosen labour market frictions or efficiency wages as a source of regional unemployment 
differentials, to arrive at similar results. For example, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) present a regional efficiency wage 
model that can be easily extended with land markets.  
11 The worker is assumed to consume land and supply labour in the same region, so there is no commuting.  | 5 
 
The rent equation (2.1) illustrates an important mechanism. In the first place, incomes are partly 
capitalised in land markets, and secondly, rents increase with the regional population. 
Therefore, rents decrease with the regional unemployment rate, because the average income is 
lower in a high-unemployment region, and because such a region will attract less inhabitants in 
equilibrium  ) 0 / ( < ∂ ∂ i i u P . 
Labour markets and centralised wage bargaining 
Regional differences in labour productivity drive regional unemployment differentials. 
Economies of agglomeration are a plausible source of productivity differentials, but as the focus 
of this paper is on interaction of labour and land markets, we do not take up the burden of 
modelling these explicitly.
12 Instead, we assume that regions have different endowments of 
capital, and therefore vary in productivity. Capital is not traded between regions. As we will 
analyse a core-periphery model, we assume that the core has a larger endowment of capital. 
Each region specialises in the production of a different good that is traded on world markets.  
 
Let Ci denote the endowment of capital in region i. Suppose that region 1 is the core, and region 
2 is the periphery, then C1 > C2. For simplicity, we assume that elasticities of substitution 
between labour and capital are the same in each region. Labour and capital are the only inputs 
in the production process, so input markets for intermediate goods as well as land are ignored. 
Under Cobb-Douglas technology, production equals  , 1 α α − = i i i C L Q  where Li denotes labour. 
Equating marginal costs to marginal productivity and normalising output prices to unity, we 
obtain the factor demands  i i i w Q L / α =  and  i i i s Q C / ) 1 ( α − = , where si denotes the rent to 
capital. We substitute the demand for labour in the production function to obtain 
i i i C w Q α α α α α − − − = 1 / 1 / . In turn, substitution of Qi in the labour demand equation yields 
i i i C w L α α α − − − = 1 / 1 1 / 1 . The level of production and labour demand are thus determined by the 
wage and the regional endowment of capital.  
 
An important element of our model is that, instead of clearing labour markets in each region, 
wages are set at the national level (so w1 = w2). Although several union strategies can be 
modelled in our framework, we make the simplifying assumption that the core is dominant in 
wage negotiations. Therefore, wages are set such that markets clear in the core region. As 
labour is less productive in the periphery, the wage is set above market clearing level in this 
region. Assuming that every worker supplies one unit of labour, equating labour demand and 
supply in the core (region 1) yields  α α − = 1
1 1 ) / ( P C w . Substituting this wage in the labour 
demand equation for the periphery (region 2), we obtain  1 2 1 2 /C C P L = . As long as P1 is such 
 
12 See Helpman (1998), Tabuchi (1998) or Ottaviano et al. (2002) for models with endogenous agglomeration economies, 
where urban cost of living differentials are a source of dispersion. However, these models do not consider labour market 
imperfections and unemployment.  6 | 
that labour demand in the periphery does not exceed supply, the unemployment rate in this 
region can then be computed:  
1
2
2
1
2 1
C
C
P
P
u − =  (2.2) 
It will be shown that in an interregional equilibrium, the population in region 2 does exceed 
labour demand.  
Interregional equilibrium 
The condition for interregional equilibrium is that expected utility in each region is equal. Each 
worker in a region faces the same probability of becoming unemployed, and workers choose a 
region knowing this probability in advance. When choosing their region of residence, workers 
do not face any migration costs, but these costs are prohibitively high afterwards. In other 
words, workers choose a region of residence for their life time. We thus rule out situations in 
which workers enjoy low land prices in the periphery, but move to the core immediately after 
they have become unemployed.
13  
 
Substituting demand for land and the composite good in the utility function and equating 
expected indirect utility in each region, we obtain the equilibrium condition: 
() () [] b w u b r w r − − + = − −
2 2 1 1 β β  (2.3) 
In order to arrive at a simple analytical solution, we assume that the benefit level is zero. 
Substituting the rent equation (2.1) and the unemployment equation (2.2) into the equilibrium 
condition (2.3) yields after some rewriting  β − = 1
2 1 2 1 ) / ( / C C P P . The majority of people live in 
the core, where the capital endowment is largest and labour market conditions are the most 
favourable. The implied unemployment rate is β ) / ( 1 1 2 2 C C u − = . We verify that labour supply 
in the periphery exceeds demand as C1 > C2. The rent gradient can be expressed in terms of the 
peripheral unemployment rate in the following way: 
β / 1
2
1
2 ) 1 ( u
r
r
− =  (2.4) 
Equation 2.4 shows that regional land rent differentials correlate negatively to unemployment 
differentials, compensating workers for less favourable labour market conditions. It provides an 
 
13 Compare for example the regional efficiency wage model in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), where a similar assumption 
is made.  | 7 
economic interpretation for estimates of the relationship between house prices and 
unemployment, which will be presented in a more general framework in Section 4.
14  
 
Finally, note that the condition that wages are the same in each region may be relaxed. For 
instance, let us assume that regional wage rigidities due to bargaining at the national level 
hamper full adjustment to local labour market conditions, without restricting the wage at exactly 
the same level in each region. Unemployment exists in the periphery as long as the wage is set 
above its competitive level, and regional wages and unemployment correlate negatively. Hence, 
in this extension, both a wage curve and regional unemployment differentials are observed in 
equilibrium.  
 
 
14 In order to close the general equilibrium model, we have to discuss ownership of land and capital. Suppose that land and 
capital are owned by a government, which leases these commodities to consumers and producers respectively. The rents 
are used to finance unemployment benefits and excess government income is redistributed through lump sum transfers. 
Although closing the model in this way would make the analytical solution more cumbersome, the qualitative properties of 
the model would not be affected. 8 | 
3  Compensation and regional adjustment 
Housing markets may play a major role not only in a long-run compensating equilibrium, but 
also in the adjustment process towards such an equilibrium. Relevant properties of housing 
markets that generate compensation are inelastic supply and durability of constructs. Even in 
the absence of any government involvement in housing or related input markets, short-run 
supply of housing is inelastic because of the construction process. Making land suitable for 
building, constructing houses and providing the necessary infrastructure are time-consuming 
activities. Moreover, regulations regarding the type and location of housing, as well as the 
involvement of municipalities and local communities, are likely to delay construction 
substantially. Once built, the constructs tend to remain in place for decades, or even centuries. 
Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) present evidence for the US that downward adjustment of the 
housing stock is even more inelastic than supply of new houses because of durability, implying 
that urban decline takes much longer than urban growth.  
 
Let us consider a two region model again, where markets are assumed to be in equilibrium. 
Suppose that one of the regions is hit by an adverse labour demand shock. In this region, wages 
will go down, unemployment will rise, and labour will migrate to the other region. Durability of 
housing in the region that experienced the adverse shock implies that supply does not adjust to 
decreased demand, and house prices go down. Moreover, as supply of housing in the other 
region is rigid, house prices will go up there in the short run.
15 Rigidities in housing markets 
thus create a short-run compensating differential that exceeds compensation in a long-run 
equilibrium, sustaining regional unemployment differentials out of equilibrium. 
 
Inelastic supply and durability of housing affect aggregate unemployment as well as regional 
unemployment differentials, because labour mobility would reduce any spatial mismatch of 
labour supply and demand. Evidence is provided by Bover et al. (1989), who analyse aggregate 
time series of wages and unemployment in the UK. For both variables, they find an upward 
effect of regional cost-of-living differentials and of housing market institutions that hamper 
mobility. 
 
 
15 Glaeser et al. (2005) show for US metropolitan areas that positive demand shocks translate into either high house prices 
and wages or population growth, depending on the rigidity of housing supply. They find a significant impact of local 
regulation on house prices and wages. In Europe, where land use controls are stronger in most countries, these effects are 
expected to be stronger.  | 9 
4 Empirical  analysis 
Section 2 demonstrates that a plausible set of assumptions may generate equilibrium regional 
unemployment differentials and compensation in housing markets, but we consider the derived 
model too stylised for a direct confrontation with the data. In particular, wages are unlikely to 
be fully fixed by centralised wage bargaining, and there may be compensation in amenity 
differentials. Therefore, we employ a more general framework for estimation of the 
compensating differential. Maintaining the assumption that equilibrium is achieved through 
worker mobility, it is implied that (expected) utility in each region is the same. In the presence 
of wage and amenity differentials, this no-arbitrage condition (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005) can 
be written in the following manner: 
⎟ ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜ ⎜
⎝
⎛
=
+ +
amenities   , nt unemployme   wages costs   housing
-
,  (4.1 
Equation 4.1 states that housing costs are higher in locations that offer higher wages, lower 
unemployment rates and more valuable amenities. We may interpret it as a hedonic model for 
land rents, fitting the framework that was essentially set out by Rosen (1979) and Roback 
(1982).
16 The coefficient for unemployment reflects the compensating differential in housing 
markets that theory predicts.
17 It should be noted that it does not have a causal interpretation, 
because house prices, wages and unemployment are simultaneously determined in a general 
equilibrium. This no-arbitrage condition underpins our empirical specifications, which are 
estimated on city-level data in Section 4.1 and on housing demand survey data in Section 4.2.
18  
 
16 Blomquist et al. (1988) and Gyourko and Tracy (1989, 1991) and Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) are studies in the same 
tradition.   
17 In the theoretical analysis, we have assumed that workers choose a region of residence for their life time. Forward looking 
behaviour implies a relationship between house prices and (appropriately discounted) future regional unemployment rates 
or, loosely speaking, the structural unemployment rate. In the empirical analysis, we include the current unemployment rate, 
which can be regarded as a reasonable approximation of the structural rate in a cross-sectional analysis. However, 
measurement error implies that our estimates of compensation for structural unemployment are conservative. 
18 The collection of regional house price data for different countries in Europe, let alone micro economic data that allow 
controlling for housing attributes, has turned out to be a difficult task. Given the relevance of the subject for policy, more 
effort in the collection of such data by national and international organisations would be most welcome in our view.  10 | 
4.1  European Urban Audit data 
In the Urban Audit (European Commission, 2004), unemployment and average house price per 
square meter are observed for 113 cities in 9 different countries, in the period 1999 −  2003.
19 
Appendix 1 contains a table with all the observations. Although our theoretical analysis was 
primarily at the level of regions, an empirical analysis of cities has the advantage that these are 
more homogeneous than regions. Moreover, intercity commuting is likely to be much smaller 
than interregional commuting.
20 Table 4.1 shows bivariate relationships between house prices 
and unemployment rates, both in logarithms, for each country separately.  
 
This analysis provides preliminary evidence of compensation in house prices, indicating a 
negative relationship with unemployment for each country. For 5 out of 9 countries, including 
the countries for which we have the most observations, the estimated elasticity is between − 0.4 
and − 0.6. Furthermore, an elasticity in this range would not be statistically rejected at the 10 
percent level for any of the other countries.
21 The relationship seems sufficiently homogeneous 
over countries to justify pooling of the data. In a regression of house prices on unemployment 
and country dummies, shown in the first column of Table 4.2, we find an elasticity of − 0.48 
with a standard error of 0.05. House prices are 5 percent lower on average in cities where 
unemployment is 10 percent up, which is a sizeable effect.  
Table 4.1  Bivariate regressions of house prices on unemployment  
Country Coefficient Std.  error R
2  N of obs. 
Denmark   − 1.548 0.703 0.708 4 
Finland  − 0.418 0.073 0.942 4 
Czech republic  − 0.942 0.157 0.923 5 
Sweden  − 0.128 0.394 0.034 5 
The Netherlands  − 0.130 0.172 0.125 6 
France  − 0.443 0.222 0.285 12 
Spain  − 0.536 0.284 0.182 18 
UK  − 0.436 0.138 0.311 24 
Germany  − 0.532 0.058 0.714 35 
Note: average house price per square meter and unemployment are in logarithms. Data points are so-called core cities as defined in 
European Commission (2004). Countries are put in order of the number of cities observed. The raw data are shown in the Appendix 1.  
 
 
19 This dataset is collected by Eurostat, and it contains information on cities in EU member states. Themes covered range 
from demography and socio-economic aspects to environment. Therefore, the choice for covariates reflecting amenity 
differentials is relatively broad. The data being presented at three different spatial levels, we consider the core city level, 
which is delineated on the basis of administrative boundaries. We leave Estonia out of our sample, since we have only 2 
observations for this country.  
20 Commuting between regions weakens the negative relationship between unemployment and house prices, as workers are 
able to enjoy cheaper housing in one region and more favourable labour market conditions in another region. 
21 The precision of the estimate and the share of variation accounted for varies wildly between countries. The standard 
errors for Germany and Finland are remarkably small and the R
2 statistics are large, but in Denmark, Sweden and the 
Netherlands, an elasticity of zero cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level of significance due to larger standard errors.  | 11 
The no-arbitrage condition (5) states that the estimated relationship between house prices and 
unemployment can be interpreted as a compensating differential, once we have controlled for 
wage and amenity differentials. The wage is not observed in the Urban Audit, so we include 
median household income in a multivariate regression instead. Amenities are measured through 
population density, temperature, the average temperature of the warmest month, crime, the 
number of recorded crimes per 1,000 residents and tourism, the number of tourist overnight 
stays in registered accommodation per year per resident. Population density may be regarded as 
an amenity if people value short-distance social interactions. More importantly, we include this 
variable as it is likely to correlate with unobserved amenities, such as a wider choice of theatres, 
bars and so on. Similarly, tourism is likely to be correlated with unobserved amenities.  
Table 4.2  Estimation of the no-arbitrage equation on average city house prices 
Variable         Model 1         Model 2         Model 3 
  Coefficient  Std. error Coefficient std. error Coefficient  Std. error 
Unemployment  − 0.484  0.052 − 0.353 0.071 − 0.247  0.053 
Income     0.626 0.192  0.913  0.176 
Population density     0.120 0.011  0.122  0.006 
Temperature   − 0.012 0.038 − 0.017  0.031 
Crime     0.046 0.043 − 0.068  0.048 
Tourism     0.072 0.020  0.074  0.013 
Czech republic  − 0.883  0.008 − 0.783 0.037    
Germany         Reference country 
Denmark   − 0.741  0.025 − 0.671 0.050    
Spain  − 0.302  0.025 − 0.054 0.080 − 0.140  0.076 
Finland  − 0.172  0.020 − 0.477 0.081    
France  − 0.322  0.020 − 0.207 0.027 − 0.204  0.034 
The Netherlands  − 0.586  0.031 − 0.739 0.040 − 0.709  0.050 
Sweden  − 0.659  0.020 − 0.661 0.049    
UK  − 0.500  0.015 − 0.375 0.032    
Constant   8.643  0.110  1.115 1.950 − 1.381  1.653 
R
2  0.681 0.788 0.860 
N. of obs.  113 113 67 
Note: average house price per square meter is the dependent variable, all variables are in logarithms. In Model 2, missing values of 
covariates have been substituted with country means, or sample means if there were less than two observations for a country. In Model 
3, there is no substitution of missings and observations for the Czech republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Sweden and the UK have to 
be excluded. Reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation within countries. For details on the variables used, 
see European Commission (2004). 
 
Table 4.2 presents estimates of house prices on these variables, all taken in logarithms. Next to 
the regression without controls that we discussed earlier, two other specifications are presented, 
because the control variables contain a lot of missing observations. In Model 2, missings are 
substituted with country means, or sample means if there were less than two observations for a 
country. Model 3 is estimated on the sample of cities for which we observe all controls. For 12 | 
both specifications, statistically significant relationships between house prices and 
unemployment are reported, although controlling for income and amenity differentials reduces 
the estimate somewhat. Furthermore, the difference between the Model 2 and Model 3 
estimates indicates some heterogeneity between countries after including controls in the model, 
in spite of our findings in Table 4.1.  
Estimated effects of the control variables are consistent with the no-arbitrage interpretation of 
Equation 4.1, as housing is more expensive in locations that offer higher incomes or a more 
attractive set of amenities. The elasticity to household income is close to unity. Of the variables 
that measure or proxy amenity differentials, only population density and tourism appear to have 
statistically significant effects. Notably, temperature does not appear to play any role, although 
US studies tend to find large effects of climate variables (cf. Blomquist et al., 1988).
22 As 
consumer amenities are more likely to capitalise in land than in labour markets, this suggests 
that amenity models, such as estimated for the US by Marston (1985), can not account for 
within-country regional unemployment differentials in Europe.
23  
4.2  Evidence from a housing demand survey 
Estimates of compensating differentials in housing markets on aggregate data may be biased, 
because heterogeneity of the housing stock is ignored. Houses in low-unemployment regions 
may be more expensive, because the average quality is higher. Presumably, this bias is limited, 
because house prices in our city-level analysis are scaled to area, and because we control for 
income and amenity differentials. However, the point is further examined here, in an analysis of 
quality-controlled house prices. Since these prices may be regarded as land rents, the 
interpretation of Equation 4.1 as a hedonic land rent model is enhanced.  
 
Land rent differentials are estimated by regressing house prices on characteristics and region 
dummies. We perform this hedonic house price analysis on Dutch housing demand surveys 
(WBO’s) for the years 1985 and 2002, which have a sample size of roughly 100,000 households 
each. The broad range of housing variables includes space-related attributes such the type of 
house, the number of rooms and availability of a garden, as well as other attributes such as year 
of construction and availability of central heating.  
 
22  We have experimented with other climate variables but all appeared to be statistically insignificant.  
23 Indeed, in a regression of unemployment on amenity variables, we found no significant effect of temperature. Moreover, 
tourism had a negative effect and unemployment and crime appeared to be positively correlated, although the amenity 
model of unemployment would predict reverse signs.    | 13 
In addition, our dataset contains labour market related household characteristics, such as age 
and educational attainment of some members as well as wages and household income.
24 The 
regional level considered is the European NUTS3 level, which consists of 40 so-called COROP 
regions.
25 Results for the hedonic house price model are shown in Appendix 2. Bivariate 
relationships between unemployment and both house prices and land rents, controlled for 
period-specific heterogeneity, are presented in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3  Bivariate regressions of house prices and land rents on unemployment  
Dependent variable  Coefficient Std. error R
2  N of obs. 
Average regional house price  − 0.244 0.060 0.283 80 
Land rent from hedonic model  − 0.336 0.072 0.302 80 
Note: all variables are in logarithms. Land rents are obtained by estimating a hedonic house price model that includes region dummies, 
results are shown in Appendix 2. Time dummies are included in these bivariate models, and standard errors are robust to autocorrelation 
and heteroskedasticity between regions. 
  
Consistent with our findings for city-level data, Table 4.3 indicates that both average house 
prices and land rents are about 3 percent lower in regions where unemployment is 10 percent 
up. It suggests that ignoring heterogeneity of the housing stock leads to underestimation of the 
relationship between house prices and unemployment, although the difference is not statistically 
significant.  
Table 4.4  Estimation of the no-arbitrage equation on regional house prices and land rents 
Variable     Model 1 (house prices)               Model 2 (land rents) 
  Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error 
Unemployment  − 0.156  0.068 − 0.158  0.058 
Regional component wages    0.629  0.625  0.889  0.522 
Population density   0.059  0.033  0.148  0.027 
R
2  0.419 0.742 
Number of observations  80 80 
Note: all variables are in logarithms. The regional component of wages is obtained by regressing male hourly wages on age and 
educational attainment (both in 5 classes) as well as region dummies for each period. Coefficients of time dummies are included in the 
regressions, but not reported in the table. Standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity between regions.  
 
Again, in order to interpret the relationship between land rents and unemployment as a 
compensating differential, we include regional wage and amenity differentials in our analysis. 
 
24 We supplement these data with regional unemployment data taken from two sources. Unemployment in 2002 is derived 
from the labour force survey (EBB) from Statistics Netherlands, and for 1985 we use registered unemployment (Sociaal-
economische Maandstatistiek, 1985). From a 1985 labour force survey, we have regional unemployment data for a higher 
level of spatial aggregation. At that level, it correlates almost perfectly with the registered unemployment data. Also, we use 
population density from Statistics Netherlands.  
25 This dataset is less suitable for estimation of the relationship between house prices and unemployment at the city level. 
Ignoring interregional commuting, we would expect to find the same relationship at the regional as at the city level, since 
micro data allow to control for urban-rural heterogeneity of the housing stock to a large extent.  14 | 
Our dataset allows to control for the regional component to wages rather than average 
household income, which is consistent with an interpretation of the regression model as a no-
arbitrage condition. It is obtained by regressing wages of full-time working males on age, 
educational attainment and period-specific region dummies. Amenity differentials are measured 
by population density. Furthermore, we include period dummies. Table 4.4 shows estimates 
where the dependent variable is either regional average house prices (Model 1) or land rents 
(Model 2).  
In regressions that include wage and amenity differentials, both house prices and land rents 
appear to be almost 2 percent lower in regions where unemployment is 10 percent up.
26 
Therefore, controlling for heterogeneity of the housing stock does not seem to affect our 
estimate of the compensating differential.
27 Furthermore, land is more expensive in locations 
that offer higher wages or more attractive amenities, as reflected in a higher population density. 
The coefficients are consistent with our findings for European cities in Table 2. Note that these 
effects are not statistically significant when we regard average house prices instead of land 
rents, and they account for a much smaller share of the variance.
28 
 
The pattern of observed land prices, unemployment and wages in the Netherlands seems 
consistent with the core-periphery model of section 2, with a core consisting of the densely 
populated regions in the west of the country (the Randstad area). Estimation of a standard wage 
curve equation on our data yields an elasticity of − 0.06, which is significantly smaller than the 
− 0.10 coefficient of Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). Hence, rigidities due to centralised wage 
bargaining seem to play a role. Higher wages in the Randstad plausibly reflect a productivity 
advantage due to economies of agglomeration. As predicted by our model, land prices in this 
area are above, and unemployment is below the national average.  
 
An important point we take from our analysis of housing demand survey data is that analyses 
using aggregate house price data are unlikely to overestimate the compensating differential. 
This indicates that conclusions from our analysis of the Urban Audit data, which draw on 
variation in house prices and unemployment rates for several countries, are not critically flawed 
because of omission of housing quality characteristics.  
 
26 Consistent with our findings in Table 1, the estimated compensating differential is somewhat smaller in the Netherlands 
than in other European countries. Commuting between the COROP regions, which averages about 20 percent of the 
working labour force, may account for this difference. We have included a spatial lag of unemployment in the regression (the 
average of unemployment in neighbouring regions), but this variable was not statistically significant.  
27 Replacing the regional component to wages by average household income, we obtained a similar result.  
28 Estimates of the compensating differential for 1985 and 2002 separately do not deviate from the estimates in Table 4 in a 
statistically significant way. Observing unemployment and house prices for two periods, it is possible to include regional 
fixed effects in the hedonic land rent model. However, it is the structural component to regional unemployment differentials 
that is compensated in housing markets, and changes of unemployment over time are likely to capture this component less 
well than levels do. Moreover, the variation over time is too limited to enable identification. The correlation coefficient of the 
logarithm of unemployment in 1985 and 2002 is 0.50, for wages it is 0.70 and for household income it is 0.62. Nevertheless, 
changes of unemployment over the period 1985 −  2002 correlate negatively to changes in land prices, although this 
relationship is not statistically significant.  | 15 
5  Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper has provided empirical evidence for compensation of regional unemployment 
differentials in housing markets. Employing an extensive dataset on European cities, an 
elasticity ranging from − 0.6 to − 0.4 could not be rejected for any of the 9 countries observed. 
Including city-level income and amenity variables in a regression that was interpreted as a no-
arbitrage condition, a somewhat smaller compensating differential was found. Although these 
estimates may still be biased because of omitted variables, an analysis of housing demand 
surveys for the Netherlands indicated that they are robust to omission of house attributes.
29  
 
Do these estimates imply full compensation of regional unemployment? We address this 
question by comparing the income effect of an increase in regional unemployment to the 
income effect of an associated decrease in house prices.
30 Suppose that workers spend about a 
third of their income on housing, and that benefits amount to 70 percent of wages. If wages are 
not affected by regional unemployment, then with an elasticity of − 0.3, compensation in house 
prices exceeds the income loss due to increased probability of unemployment by far.
31 
However, the two effects come remarkably close to cancelling out when we assume a wage 
curve elasticity of − 0.10.
32 The substantial compensating differential indicated by our empirical 
results thus strongly suggests that high regional unemployment rates proxy less favourable 
labour market conditions, which result in lower wages as well.
33 Hence, we regard it as indirect 
evidence of the wage curve relationship between regional unemployment and wages.  
 
The existence of a compensating differential in housing markets has a number of implications 
for policy. Currently, the European Union and many of its member countries spend billions of 
 
29 For example, our findings are conditional on the assumption that the benefits of agglomeration are controlled for by 
population density. The compensating differential is overestimated when a city is attractive both for consumers and 
producers, so that house prices are high and unemployment is low, but this is not reflected in the population density.  
30 This is obviously a rather rough evaluation of compensation, which ignores any substitution effects, as well as 
compensating differentials in other markets, in particular for nontradables, that are likely to correlate to the price differential 
in housing markets. Heterogeneity of the labour force is not accounted for either. Compensation in housing markets may not 
accrue to the unemployed in particular, nor to groups that are most vulnerable to unemployment. On the contrary, as these 
groups are likely to be overrepresented in the highly regulated rental market, they may find it more difficult to benefit from 
lower house prices. We do not consider the rental market explicitly in this paper, but further research on this topic would be 
most welcome in our view. 
31 If unemployment is 5 percent, then the income effect due to lower house prices is roughly about a factor 10 higher than 
the expected income loss due an to increased probability of unemployment.  
32 Note that for the Netherlands, we found a smaller elasticity of both house prices and wages to regional unemployment. 
Therefore, the two income effects come close to cancelling out for this country as well.  
33 It is common practice to regard the unemployment rate as a macro-economic indicator. In a similar vein, the regional 
unemployment rate indicates regional economic conditions. It may be correlated with wages, but also with the quality of 
matches and other labour market variables. The evidence thus suggests that housing markets compensate for regional 
labour market conditions, rather than for the loss in expected income due to unemployment only. As wages and 
unemployment do not correlate perfectly, both are informative on these conditions. Consequently, the positive relationship 
between house prices and the regional component to wages, or average household income, may also be interpreted as 
compensation for regional labour market conditions.  16 | 
euros on regional support programs, which are motivated at least partly by equity considerations 
(cohesion). Differences in per capita income tend to be an important criterion for the selection 
of regions to be supported. However, our empirical evidence of compensation in housing 
markets does suggest that regional differences in unemployment or GDP per capita overstate 
differences in welfare within countries, and interregional equity may therefore a less important 
issue.
34 Hence, the allocation of funds for regional support may improve when the existence of 
compensating differentials is taken into account.  
 
Compensation in housing markets has implications for labour market policies as well. In a 
theoretical model, we have shown that regional unemployment differentials may result from 
centralised wage bargaining. Therefore, the recommendation of OECD (2000, 2005) and 
European Commission (2003) to relax the regional wage rigidities associated with these 
institutions applies in the framework of our model. Moreover, in most European countries 
unemployment benefit levels are also partly set at the national level.
35 Compensation then 
implies a regional differential in real benefit levels. The desirability of such a differential is 
questionable from the perspective of equity. Also, it may reduce the incentive to job search for 
people in high-unemployment regions more than in other regions. Hence, there would be a case 
for adjustment of unemployment benefit levels to regional cost-of-living differentials.  
 
A third area of policy we touch upon refers to housing markets and spatial planning. As we 
have argued in section 3, housing markets may play a major role in regional adjustment 
processes, because of inelastic supply and durability of housing. These properties of the good 
are not necessarily related to regulations. However, in many European countries, governments, 
municipalities and other local bodies have a major say in what type of housing should be 
constructed and where it should be built. This public involvement is generally thought to delay 
and restrict housing supply, and therefore increases the compensating differential. In turn, 
regional adjustment of labour supply and clearing of aggregate labour markets is hampered (cf. 
Bover et al., 1989). Furthermore, the supply of land for habitation or production is restricted by 
spatial planning and land use controls. Therefore, these policies may also increase regional 
differentials in house prices and unemployment in equilibrium. 
  
 
34 In the theoretical model of Section 2, regional utility differentials are absent by assumption. Such an assumption is unlikely 
to hold for utility differentials between countries. Therefore, both our theoretical and empirical work focus on regional 
differences within countries. Note however, that European regional support programs (Structural Funds) also aim to 
redistribute between countries. This paper does not contain any implications for the appropriateness or desirability of these 
policies to the extent that they envisage redistribution between member countries of the European Union.  
35 In most countries, the benefit level depends the duration of unemployment. Benefits start at a level that depends on the 
previously earned income, but then decrease to nationally set benefit levels (welfare).  | 17 
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Appendix 1       City-level house prices and unemployment rates  
City House 
price 
Unemp. City  House 
price
Unemp. City   House 
price 
Unemp. 
Czech republic     Erfurt  1432 15.1 Rotterdam  1423  5.9 
Praha 1563  5.4  Augsburg  2270 5.5 Utrecht  1364  3.0 
Brno 781  9.1  Bonn  2127 4.5 Groningen  1384  6.4 
Ostrava 469  17.3  Karlsruhe  2454 5.3 Arnhem  1410  5.9 
Plzen 781  8.1  Mönchengladbach 2250 7.2 Finland    
Usti nad Labem  625  13.5  Mainz  2618 5.2 Helsinki  1943  5.8 
Denmark     Spain  Tampere 1307  16.0 
København 1546  4.5  Madrid  1855 12.4 Turku  1316  16.3 
Aarhus 1321  5.2  Barcelona  2500 10.8 Oulu  1181  15.9 
Odense 1039  5.2  Valencia  874 14.2 Sweden    
Aalborg 1052  5.8  Sevilla  1028 22.8 Stockholm  2064  3.3 
Germany     Zaragoza  1102 11.8 Göteborg  1409  5.6 
Berlin 1759  14.9  Málaga  965 21.0 Malmö    1468  9.1 
Hamburg 2250  7.6  Murcia  698 11.5 Jönköping  791  3.4 
München 3784  3.6  Las  Palmas  1222 19.9 Umeå  935  11.0 
Köln 2454  7.3  Valladolid  1172 14.6 UK    
Frankfurt am Main  3150  5.4  Palma di Mallorca  1381 12.0 London  2904  6.5 
Essen 2495  7.7  Santiago  de 
Compostela 1055 12.2
Birmingham 1318  9.5 
Leipzig 1473  17.4  Vitoria/Gasteiz  1744 9.9 Leeds  1336  5.1 
Dresden 1677  14.7  Oviedo  1180 14.1 Glasgow  1321  10.8 
Dortmund 2413  9.6  Pamplona/Iruňa 1655 10.7 Bradford  1042 6.9 
Düsseldorf 2577  6.3  Santander  1319 15.7 Liverpool  992  11.1 
Bremen 1452  8.3  Toledo 889 10.8 Edinburgh    2014  5.2 
Hannover 1595  9.4  Badajoz 661 20.9 Manchester  1307  9.0 
Nürnberg 2413  7.6  Logroňo 1180 10.6 Cardiff  1489  4.9 
Bochum 2372  7.8  France  Sheffield 1136  6.7 
Wuppertal 2004  6.5  Lyon  1400 11.5 Bristol  1533  4.6 
Bielefeld 1841  7.8  Bordeaux  1200 14.3 Belfast  1361  9.6 
Halle an der Saale  1104  20.8  Nantes  1200 13.2 Newcastle 
upon Tyne 
 
1189 
 
8.0 
Magdeburg 1432  19.0  Lille  1200 14.4 Leicester  1084  7.9 
Wiesbaden 3477  6.0  Saint-Etienne  1000 13.5 Derry  951  12.0 
Göttingen 1800  10.0  Le  Havre  1000 17.1 Aberdeen  1408  5.0 
Mülheim a.d.Ruhr  1963  6.1  Rennes  1400 9.0 Cambridge  2536  3.8 
Moers 2045  6.6  Nancy  1000 11.1 Exeter  1553  3.9 
Darmstadt 2556  5.3  Orléans 1400 8.7 Lincoln  1016  6.4 
Trier 1841  7.6  Dijon  1400 10.7 Gravesham  1937  5.2 
Freiburg im Breisgau  2700  6.0  Grenoble  1600 13.2 Stevenage  1762  4.0 
Regensburg 2104  6.3  Ajaccio  1000 14.2 Wrexham  1179  5.1 
Frankfurt (Oder)  1340  18.9  The Netherlands  Portsmouth 1571  4.6 
Weimar 1432  14.7  s'  Gravenhage  1714 3.4 Worcester  1549  3.8 
Schwerin 1227  15.8  Amsterdam  1781 4.3    
Note: these data are obtained from the Urban Audit (European Commission, 2004). The spatial level considered is the core city, which is 
delineated on the basis of administrative boundaries. House prices refer to the average house price in euros per square meter. These 
data refer to the period 1999 - 2003 (so not to the same year for each country).  | 21 
Appendix 2      Hedonic house price analysis (used to obtain land rents) 
Variable  Coefficient Standard error 
Dwelling type (reference is apartment)   
Free standing   0.478 0.047 
Semi-detached (1985)   0.209 0.051 
Semi-detached (2002)   0.190 0.053 
Corner house   0.066 0.051 
Terraced house   − 0.018 0.051 
Number of rooms (reference is 1)   
2   0.070 0.089 
3   0.233 0.092 
4   0.358 0.092 
5   0.446 0.091 
6   0.546 0.089 
7 or more   0.690 0.092 
Garden   0.152 0.024 
Size living room exceeds 30 m
2   0.165 0.005 
Size kitchen exceeds 8 m
2 (1985)   0.050 0.008 
Size kitchen exceeds 8 m
2 (2002)   0.104 0.006 
Central heating (1985)   0.235 0.011 
Central heating (2002)   0.158 0.015 
Double-glazing in living room   0.023 0.010 
Double-glazing in rest of the house (1985)   0.067 0.007 
Double-glazing in rest of the house (2002)   0.037 0.008 
Balcony (no ground floor apartment)   0.090 0.009 
Elevator (no ground floor apartment)   0.103 0.054 
Period of construction (reference is before 1945)   
1945 - 1959  − 0.046 0.011 
1960 - 1969 (1985)   0.030 0.011 
1960 - 1969 (2002)  − 0.104 0.017 
1970 - 1979 (1985)   0.087 0.011 
1970 - 1979 (2002)  − 0.049 0.015 
After 1979 (1985)   0.094 0.018 
1980 - 1989 (2002)  − 0.031 0.014 
After 1989 (2002)   0.077 0.015 
Dummy 2002   1.399 0.025 
Constant  10.061 0.110 
Region dummies 1985 (40)  included 
Region dummies 2002 (40)  included 
R
2  0.794 
Number of observations  49,459 
Note: hedonic regression of house prices in logarithms on characteristics and period-specific region dummies, estimated on Dutch 
housing demand survey data (WBO) for 1985 and 2002. We have estimated two specifications of this model. In one specification, all 
coefficients were period-specific. In the second specification, which is reported here, only statistically significant variation of coefficients 
over time was allowed for. For these variables, the year between brackets indicate the period to which the effect refers. Reported 
standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity at the regional level. Coefficients for period-specific dummies are 
used as estimates of regional land rent differentials in the paper.  
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